Random Assemblies as a Popular Branch

Randomly allotted national assembly of 525 members who debate in groups of 15 in small civic jury meetings in plenary sessions. They discuss proposals after ten percent of the voting population agreed to put them on the deliberative agenda. Next to citizens, representative decision-making bodies can also send policies to the random assembly with a supermajority in one chamber, along with a simple majority in another house. This allows avoiding gridlock in the traditional legislative bodies. After deliberation in the civic jury meetings, policy proposals are voted upon in the random assembly and if they are accepted and signed by the national president, they come into practice. However, a double supermajority in both legislative houses can block the implementation of the policy proposal, and can be challenged by the judicial branch as well.

Proponents: Ethan Leib

For further interest on this topic:

https://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-02363-5.html

Category:
Reason for intervention

Institutional impact

Governance level

Maturity

Radicality

Legitimacy decision

Background